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Abstract
In a symmetric independent private values setting a sealed-bid double auction
dissolves a partnership e¢ciently. This well known result remains valid in a model
with interdependent valuations. However, if the interdependent components of valu-
ations are large agents might prefer not to participate in a double auction. Therefore
a simple extention of the rules of double-auctions is suggested that ensures partici-
pation. Even though these modi…ed double auctions are not incentive e¢cient, they
still realize gains from trade and can be implemented without knowledge about the
model’s speci…cations.
1 Introduction
When two (or more) partners own a …rm together and want to dissolve the partnership
they face the problem of choosing a ”good” way to do so. A common situation is one
where di¤erent partners are responsible for di¤erent parts or departments of their …rm.
It is natural to assume that they gain di¤erent information that helps them valuing their
partnership as a whole. A dissolution mechanism therefore has to take into account the
fact that at the end of a partnership each of the partners might neither know the other
partner’s valuation nor her own valuation for the entire …rm. The latter is due to the
fact that a partner’s valuation for the entire …rm also depends on private information
of the other partner who has gained more accurate information about the part of the
…rm she was supervising. Obviously no partner is willing to reveal her information for
free because this may lead to disadvantages in negotiations about the conditions of the
dissolution. Therefore agents have to be paid an informational rent to reveal their in-
formation truthfully. If the agents are not subsidized by a third party these rents have
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to be generated by the trading possibilities due to di¤erences in valuations. An impor-
tant question in this context is whether the partnership can be dissolved e¢ciently, i.e.
whether a trading mechanism exists that allocates the entire partnership to the partner
who (ex-post) values it most. In a su¢ciently symmetric setting with independent pri-
vate values an ex-post e¢cient dissolution can be achieved by a simple mechanism, the
so called k¡double auction1. In the k¡double auction the partners each submit a sealed
bid and the entire partnership is allocated to the partner with the highest bid. The high-
est bidder’s payment to the other partners is a convex combination of the highest bid
(bH) and second highest bid (bL), i.e. the payment for the entire partnership is given by
kbL+(1¡ k) bH where k 2 [0; 1]. Since the rules of the k¡double auction are independent
of the valuation structure2, a mechanism designer does not need to know the details of a
given trading situation in order to implement this mechanism. Furthermore the k¡double
auction is ex-post budget-balanced which means that it never has to be subsidized by the
mechanism designer. This suggests that the k¡double auction is a favorable dissolution
mechanism in an independent private values framework. In particular it is better than a
Clark-Groves-Vickrey mechanism (which is not ex-post budget balanced) or a widely used
shoot-out mechanism in which one side submits an o¤er and the other side has the choice
of either buying or selling at the o¤ered price. Note that because the partner who makes
the initial o¤er will (in general) not bid her true valuation, the shoot-out mechanism is
not ex-post e¢cient.
In this paper I concentrate on the case of an equal partnership with two partners and
a symmetric valuation structure. In contrast to most of the existing literature, I allow
for interdependent valuations. In my model the agents’ valuations depend on own private
information and on private information available to the other agent. Therefore the agents’
valuations are correlated3. I restrict attention to the case of a positive correlation between
agents’ valuations. This structure of the valuations does (in contrast to an independent
private values model) take into account that both partners might have gathered private
insight in the …rm which determines the valuations of both partners.
I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies of the k¡double auc-
tion. This equilibrium is symmetric and results in an e¢cient allocation. An important
di¤erence compared to an independent private values model is that agents no longer have
the opportunity to ensure themselves a positive payo¤ by participating in the k¡double
auction. This is due to the fact that agents do not know their valuations on the in-
terim stage. Therefore they do not have a rescue strategy, as in the private values case,
where submitting the valuation always guarantees a positive payo¤4. I show that in
environments where no budget-balanced, individually rational and incentive compatible
1A double auction is ex-post e¢cient in a su¢ciently symmetric setting with independent private values
in case of risk neutral partners (see Cramton et al. [1987]) or partners with CARA-utility functions (see
McAfee [1992]).
2i.e. independent of valuation functions and distributions of types
3The agent’s information is assumed to be independently distributed.
4Note that bidding her own valuation can never be unpro…table for a partner since she sells her share
only if payments exceed her valuation and buys the other agent’s share only if payments are below her
valuation.
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mechanism that dissolves the partnership in an ex-post e¢cient way exists, the e¢cient
equilibrium of the k¡double auction is not individually rational. The intuition behind
this shortcoming of the k¡double auction is given by the fact that a bidder has to take
into account a winner’s and a looser’s curse. If a partner wins the double auction this is
”bad news” for her since this indicates that her partner’s and therefore her own valuation
are likely to be low. On the other hand, if she looses this again is ”bad news” since this
suggests that her partner’s information indicates a high value of the …rm. If we cannot
force agents to participate, the rules of the k¡double auction have to be extended in a
way such that voluntary participation is guaranteed. This is done by allowing for non-
participating or vetoing against the dissolution: If at least one agent vetoes or does not
participate, the mechanism designer (auctioneer) implements the initial allocation of the
partnership thus creating ine¢ciencies. However the k¡double auction with the opportu-
nity to veto results in an ex-post e¢cient allocation whenever it is possible to dissolve the
partnership e¢ciently in general, i.e. whenever an ex-post e¢cient, individually rational,
budget-balanced and incentive compatible dissolution mechanism exists. Given further
assumptions on the valuation functions, I show that the possibility to veto guarantees
that there always exist equilibria that still realize gains from trade. It turns out that
partners who expect to have an average valuation for the partnership prefer to veto in the
auction. Their chances of becoming buyer or seller are almost the same whereby trading
opportunities are worse than for partners with either high valuation (who mainly buy) or
low valuation (who primarily sell).
The model of this paper is based on Cramton et al.[1987] and generalizes their setting
to interdependent valuations. In McAfee[1992] special k¡double auctions are compared to
other simple dissolution mechanisms for the equal partnership case. Even though McAfee
allows for CARA-utility functions, both papers restrict attention to an independent pri-
vate values framework. Keeping the independent private values framework and assuming
equal distribution of the partnership, de Frutos [2000] compares e¢ciency and revenue of
the k¡double auction for k = 0; 1 if valuations are distributed asymmetrically. In addition
to the literature that derives properties of double auctions for the equal partnership there
exists a vast literature on k¡double auctions in the case of a buyer and a seller (which can
be seen as an extreme case of a partnership where property rights belong to one agent,
the seller). Leininger et al.[1989] and Satterthwaite and Williams[1989] show that in the
buyer/seller setting k¡double auctions possess a continuum of pure strategy equilibria5
if k 2 (0; 1) : These can be ranked from equilibria that realize no gains from trade to
equilibria that are incentive e¢cient6. Note that the uniqueness result for equilibria in
this paper shows that multiplicity of equilibria is not necessarily present in k¡double auc-
tions, even if k 2 (0; 1). Bulow et al.[1999] analyze special cases of the k¡double auction
in a common values model and uniform distribution of types. They analyze the e¤ects of
an unequal distribution of ownership rights on bidders advantages in a …rst-price (k = 0)
or second price (k = 1) double auction. In addition they show the general uniqueness of
5If k = 1 or k = 0 there exist an unique equilibrium.
6For the existence of incentive e¢cient equilibria the assumption of uniform distributed valuations is
needed.
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the equilibrium of double auctions if k = 0 or k = 1 in their common value model. Note
that in this paper I show uniqueness of equilibria for all k¡double auctions. Engelbrecht-
Wiggans [1994] computes equilibria of a …rst- and second-price double auction in a model
with a¢liated values.
Neglecting the problem of …nancing the agents’ informational rents, Jehiel and Moldo-
vanu [1999] show that as long as agents’ private information is one-dimensional, an e¢-
cient mechanism to dissolve the partnership can always be found7. They also show that
a re…nement of the Clarke-Groves-Vickrey approach can be used to get an e¢cient and
incentive compatible direct mechanism (this re…nement has also been done in Dasgupta
and Maskin [1999]). In Fieseler at al.[2000] this mechanism is used to analyze whether
in a partnership model with interdependent valuations there exist mechanisms that are
(ex-post) e¢cient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced. They
show that in contrast to a private values setting, it might be impossible to …nd a distri-
bution of ownership rights such that the partnership can be dissolved e¢ciently, i.e. by
an e¢cient, incentive compatible individually rational and budget balanced mechanism.
In particular they show that it might not be possible to dissolve the equal partnership
e¢ciently if the interdependence of valuations is too strong.
This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I introduce the model of interdependent
valuations. In section 3, I generalize the optimality result for symmetric k¡double auc-
tions to environments with interdependent values in which incentive compatible, (ex-post)
e¢cient, budget balanced and individually rational mechanisms exist. I also compute the
symmetric bidding equilibrium which is the unique equilibrium in pure strategies. In sec-
tion 4, I analyze those cases of separable valuation functions in which a double auction is
not individually rational. By giving each bidder the possibility to veto against a dissolu-
tion, individual rationality of the double auction (with veto) is assured. Furthermore this
auction is ex-post e¢cient in cases where ex-post e¢cient, budget balanced, individually
rational and incentive compatible mechanism exists. I compute the symmetric equilib-
rium bidding strategies of this auction and show that there always exist a symmetric
equilibrium in which gains from trade are realized. In addition I give an example in which
the double auction with veto is not the optimal (i.e. incentive e¢cient) mechanism, which
it is in the independent private values model. For that example I give an indication of
the performance of the double auction with veto. Section 5 is the conclusion. The proofs
can be found in the appendix.
2 The Model
Two risk neutral agents each own an equal share in a partnership. Each agent i has
private information represented by a type µi which in‡uences her own and her partner’s
valuation for the partnership. By µ¡i I denote the type of the agent other than i: Agent
i0s valuation for the entire partnership is given by vi (µ1; µ2) ; which I assume to be contin-
7They also show that, in general, e¢ciency is inconsistent with information revelation if private infor-
mation is multidimensional.
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uously di¤erentiable in every argument. I assume (unless otherwise stated) a symmetric
environment: the types of the agents are drawn from the same distribution function F;
and valuation functions are symmetric:
v1 (µ1; µ2) = v2 (µ2; µ1) : (1)
Note that symmetry assumptions of this type are necessary to directly compute equilibria
of the considered auctions and can also be found in Cramton et al. [1987] or McAfee[1992].
The distribution function F is strictly increasing and di¤erentiable with derivative f: The
support of f is given by
£
µ; µ
¤ ½ R: I further assume that agents’ types are independent.
The valuation function vi is strictly increasing in µi and increasing in µ¡i . I denote the
partial derivative of vi with respect to its j’th component with vi;j and I assume that
v1;1 > v2;1: (2)
Note that, because of (1), this is equivalent to v2;2 > v1;2: (2) is a common assumption in
interdependent valuation environments. It ensures the existence of e¢cient and incentive
compatible mechanisms8. Given a realization of types the utility of agent i who owns ¯i
in the entire partnership and has money mi is quasilinear and given by
ui = ¯ivi (µ1; µ2) +mi: (3)
Characteristic functions are de…ned as follows:
1 (statement) :=
½
1; if statement is true
0; if statement is false.
3 The k¡Double Auctions
The k- double auction is a Bayesian game where the strategy spaces of the agents are
given by the set of functions b :
£
µ; µ
¤ 7! R: Given her type µi; agent i submits a bid
bi (µi) 2 R: Denote the index of the agent who submits the higher bid by H and the index
of the other agent by L: Given the bids bL and bH and the parameter k 2 [0; 1]; the agent
with the higher bid gets the entire partnership and pays to the other agent the amount
1
2
((1¡ k) bH + kbL) : In case both agents submit the same bid the partnership is given to
agent i with probability 1
2
and the ”winning bidder” pays 0 (or any other …xed amount)
to the other agent. Note that such an auction is always ex-post budget balanced since
agent L gets what agent H pays. Assume that agent ¡i bids according to b¡i (µ¡i) : The
interim utility of a type µi agent who bids bi is given by
Ui (µi; bi) : =
1
2
Eµ¡i [(vi (µi; µ¡i)¡ (1¡ k) bi ¡ kb¡i (µ¡i)) 1 (bi > b¡i (µ¡i))]
+
1
2
Eµ¡i [((1¡ k) b¡i (µ¡i) + kbi ¡ vi (µi; µ¡i)) 1 (bi < b¡i (µ¡i))] :
8For a discussion of this assumption see Dasgupta and Maskin [1999] or Jehiel and Moldovanu [1999].
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The equilibrium concept used is that of pure Bayesian-Nash-Equilibrium (BNE). A BNE
(b1 (µ1) ; b2 (µ2)) is individually rational if for i = 1; 2
Ui (µi; bi (µi)) ¸ 0; 8µi: (IR)
A BNE (b1 (µ1) ; b2 (µ2)) is ex-post e¢cient if for all (µ1; µ2) 2 [µ,µ]2 we have :
v1 (µ1; µ2) > v2 (µ1; µ2)) b1 (µ1) > b2 (µ2) (EF)
which, because of µ1 > µ2 , v1 (µ1; µ2) > v2 (µ1; µ2) ; is equivalent to
µ1 > µ2 ) b1 (µ1) > b2 (µ2) :
The next Theorem characterizes the possible outcomes of the k¡double auction. It
turns out that there exists a unique BNE (in pure strategies). This equilibrium is sym-
metric.
For simplicity I use the following notation:
Vi (µi) := vi (µi; µi) ; V
0
i (µi) :=
dVi (µi)
dµi
:
Theorem 1 The k¡double auction has a unique equilibrium bidding strategy in pure
strategies given by
b (µi) = Vi (µi)¡
R µi
F¡1(k) V
0
i (u) (F (u)¡ k)2 du
(F (µi)¡ k)2
: (4)
Note that this strategy is strictly increasing and therefore the k¡double auction is
ex-post e¢cient9.
In the private values case, i.e. if vi;¡i = 0; i = 1; 2, any BNE of a k-double auction
must be individually rational because by bidding exactly her valuation each agent can
guarantee herself a positive outcome of the auction regardless of the bid of the other
bidder. Independent of k; she never pays more than her valuation for the other agent’s
share if she wins and if she looses she never gets less than her valuation for the part of the
partnership she sells10. In general, it is not possible for a partner to bid her true valuation,
which depends on private information of the other partner. Therefore a partner might
risk to loose her share for a payment that is smaller than her valuation. As shown below,
this is exactly what happens if the in‡uence of the other agent’s information on the own
valuation is high. The intuition behind this observation is that a bidder faces a winner’s
and a looser’s curse. If she wins she risks to pay too much for the partnership since
winning indicates a low partner’s type and therefore a low valuation of the partnership. If
she looses, this is again ”bad news” for her since this indicates a high type of the partner
9This Theorem generalizes results in Cramton et al [1987] and furthermore shows that there cannot
exist other pure strategy equilibria.
10Note that this argument does not depend on the assumption of equal distribution of ownership rights.
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and therefore a high value of the partnership. Since a bidder has to take these winner’s
and looser’s curses into account at the same time, she cannot correct for these in a way
that prevents her from making losses.
The following Theorem characterizes environments in which k¡double auctions are
not individually rational.
Theorem 2 A k¡double auction is individually rational if and only if there exists an
ex-post e¢cient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced direct
revelation mechanism.
An existence condition for ex-post e¢cient, incentive compatible, individually rational
and budget balanced mechanisms is given in Fieseler et al. [2000] for the class of separable
valuation functions:
vi (µi; µ¡i) = g (µi) + h (µ¡i) : (5)
Given their result and the above Theorem we get:
Theorem 3 Given valuation functions of the form (5) ; the k¡double auction is individ-
ually rational if and only if
2
Z µ
F¡1( 12)
g(µ) f(µ) dµ ¡ 2
Z µ
µ
g(µ) f(µ) F (µ) dµ +
+
Z µ
µ
h0 (µ)
¡
F 2 (µ)¡ F (µ¢) dµ ¸ 0:
Note that this existence condition depends on v and F whereas the k¡double auction
is a simple mechanism in a sense that it does not depend on the speci…cations of the
agents’ valuations and can therefore be applied universally. Nevertheless if partners are
able to refuse to participate in a k¡double auction a mechanism designer who is not
familiar with these speci…cations does not know whether the partners will participate and
how those behave who are participating but expect others not to participate. In the next
section I extend the rules of the k¡double auction to obtain a mechanism that is always
individually rational, does not depend on speci…cations of the valuation structures and
is ex-post e¢cient whenever there exist an ex-post e¢cient, individually rational, budget
balanced and incentive compatible mechanism.
4 Double Auctions with voluntary participation
To ensure that the equilibria of the k¡double auction are individually rational I extend
the strategy spaces in such a way that every agent has the right to say ”No” (write ”No”
in the sealed bid). The agents’ strategy spaces are given by the set of functions:
fb j b : £µ; µ¤ 7! R [ fNgg:
7
The outcome of the game is de…ned as follows: If b1 =N or b2 =N then the partnership
is not dissolved (or, equivalently, each agent gets the partnership with probability 1
2
).
In any other case, the partnership is given to the agent with the higher bid. He pays
p = 1
2
((1¡ k)maxfb1; b2g+ kminfb1; b2g) ; k 2 [0; 1]; to the other agent. I call this
Bayesian game the k¡double auction with veto.
Note that the k¡double auction with veto is always individually rational, because
every type can veto and therefore assure that she never makes losses by participating in
the auction. Furthermore if the k¡double auction (without veto) is individually rational
its equilibrium is also an equilibrium of the k¡double auction with veto. It is easy to see
that the k¡double auction with veto has at least one further equilibrium which does not
realize any gains from trade: always vetoing.
In the following I restrict attention to the more elaborate environments where the
k¡double auction is not individually rational. To get a precise characterization of sym-
metric Bayesian Nash equilibria I also restrict the analysis to the case of additively sep-
arable valuation functions11, i.e. agent i’s valuation for the entire partnership is given
by the function vi (µ1; µ2) = g (µi) + h (µ¡i) : I assume g; h to be twice di¤erentiable with
g0 > h0 ¸ 0: I assume the existence condition in Theorem 3 not to hold, i.e.
2
Z µ
F¡1( 12)
g(µ) f(µ) dµ ¡ 2
Z µ
µ
g(µ) f(µ) F (µ) dµ +
+
Z µ
µ
h0 (µ)
¡
F 2 (µ)¡ F (µ¢) dµ < 0:
I show that apart from the equilibrium where all types veto there exist further sym-
metric equilibria that realize gains from trade if we choose k = 1
2
: In these equilibria
the types close to the boundaries of the support of agents’ types want the partnership
to be dissolved whereas types around F¡1
¡
1
2
¢
prefer to veto. The intuition behind these
equilibria is as follows. Agents with types close to F¡1
¡
1
2
¢
are the ”worst o¤” types in
the k¡double auction mechanism, i.e. these types have the lowest interim utility of par-
ticipating in the k¡double auction. This is due to the fact that these types are (almost)
equally likely to be buyer or seller of a share. In each case the expected gains from trade
(i.e. the expected di¤erences in agents’ valuations) are small compared to types close to
the boundaries of the support of types. Therefore the types around F¡1
¡
1
2
¢
are vetoing in
the 1
2
¡double auction with veto and types close to µ or µ do not veto. Indeed the following
Theorem shows that all types in an interval [c; d] around F¡1
¡
1
2
¢
prefer to veto. This
interval is determined by the fact that agents with type c or d are indi¤erent between
vetoing and non-vetoing. The next Theorem summarizes these results and formulates
necessary conditions for c and d: These can always be ful…lled, as shown in Theorem 5.
11This restriction on the valuation functions is equivalent to requiring that the in‡uence of the other
agent’s type on an agent’s valuation does not depend on his own type, i.e. @vi@µ¡i = 0.
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Theorem 4 Let c; d 2 [µ; µ] be a solution of the following equations:
1 = F (c) + F (d)
0 =
1
2F (c)
Z c
µ
(g (t) + h (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c)) f (t) dt (6)
+
1
2F (c)
Z µ
d
(g (t) + h (t)) (F (t)¡ F (d)) f (t) dt
+
1
2
Z c
µ
g (t) f (t) dt¡ 1
2
Z µ
d
g (t) f (t) dt:
Then the following bidding strategy constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
the 1
2
¡double auction with veto:
b (µi) =
8><>>:
g (µi) + h (µi)¡
R µi
c (g
0(t)+h0(t))(F (t)¡F (c))2dt
(F (µi)¡F (c))2 if µi 2 [µ; c)
N if µi 2 [c; d]
g (µi) + h (µi)¡
R µi
d (g
0(t)+h0(t))(F (t)¡F (d))2dt
(F (µi)¡F (d))2 if µi 2 (d; µ]:
(7)
Instead of directly verifying that a deviation of the given strategy cannot be pro…table
if the other agent sticks to it, I use the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem (Theorem 6, see
the Appendix) for an indirect proof. Given an allocation rule s; the Revenue-Equivalence-
Theorem determines (up to a type-independent constant) the payments (depending on
the agents’ reported types) necessary and su¢cient to implement s in a truthtelling equi-
librium. By the revelation principle in any (indirect) mechanism that implements s the
expected payments to agents in equilibrium have to equal those given by the Revenue-
Equivalence-Theorem (up to a type independent constant). Furthermore if the expected
payments to agents induced by a given strategy-pro…le in an indirect mechanism that
implements s equal those given by the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem we know that im-
itating the strategy of a di¤erent type cannot be pro…table. Therefore I show that the
payments induced by (7) equal those of a direct mechanism that implements the allocation
resulting from (7) in truthtelling. In addition I can show that deviating to a bid outside
the range of (7) cannot be pro…table which completes the proof.
Instead of vetoing, it is also possible to extend the rules of the k¡double auction such
that the agents can choose not to participate in the k¡double auction. In this case the
k-double auction is modelled as a two stage game. In the …rst stage each agent decides
whether she participates in the 2nd stage or not. If at least one agent decides not to
participate in the 2nd stage, the partnership is not dissolved. Otherwise in the 2nd stage
a k¡double auction (without veto) is run.
Obviously the concept of a double auction with veto is only meaningful if there exist
equilibria that realize gains from trade and therefore do not sustain the status quo like
the always vetoing equilibrium.
Theorem 5 Every 1
2
¡double auction with veto has a symmetric equilibrium where not
vetoing occurs with positive probability.
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An important feature of the k¡double auction with veto is the independence of its
rules of v and F: A mechanism designer can run the auction and she gets the best possible
outcome (in terms of e¢ciency) if in general this outcome can be obtained by some budget
balanced and individually rational mechanism. If this is not possible, the set of types that
do not want to dissolve the partnership is determined by the agents themselves, depending
on their knowledge about v and F: As shown in the next section, a mechanism designer
who knows v and F might …nd a more e¢cient dissolution mechanism. This re‡ects the
intuition that a mechanism with simple rules that are independent of the speci…cations of
the model is unlikely to be always optimal. The mechanism designer might loose e¢ciency
if she has not full insight in the trading environment.
4.1 An Example for the performance of the double auction with
veto
In this section I examine the performance of the symmetric equilibria of the 1
2
¡double
auction with veto in the case of linear valuation functions
v1 (µ1; µ2) = aµ1 + bµ2; a > b ¸ 0
and uniform distribution of types on the unit interval, i.e. f (µ) = 1[0;1] (µ) :
Theorem 3 states that the 1
2
¡double auction is individually rational (and e¢cient) if
2b · a: The equilibrium of the 1
2
¡double auction is given by b (µ) = (a+ b) ¡2
3
µ + 1
6
¢
: If
2b > a the only symmetric equilibrium of the 1
2
¡double auction with veto that realizes
some gains from trade is given by
b (µi) =
8<: (a+ b)
¡
2
3
µ + 1
3
¡
1
2
¡ "¢¢ if µi 2 [0; 12 ¡ ")
N if µi 2 [12 ¡ "; 12 + "]
(a+ b)
¡
2
3
µ + 1
3
¡
1
2
+ "
¢¢
if µi 2 (12 + "; 1]:
where " = ¡1
2
a¡ 2b
2a¡ b;
Playing according to this equilibrium results in an ex-post allocation of the partnership
which can be described by the probability that agent 1 gets the entire partnership (depend-
ing on the types of the agents). Figure 1 shows the resulting allocation. The performance
of this equilibrium is measured by the ex ante gains from trade, i.e. the unweighted sum
of the agents’ ex-ante utilities. Because of budget balancedness this is given by:
GDA := (a¡ b)
µ
1
6
¡ 1
2
"+
2
3
"3
¶
:
The gains from trade that could be realized if all information were common knowledge
is given by 1
6
(a¡ b) : It can be seen that the ine¢ciencies that arise in the 1
2
¡double
auction with veto become arbitrarily small if 2b ¼ a; i.e. if " is small. To measure
the performance of the 1
2
¡double auction with veto in a more convincing way it should
be compared with other mechanisms that are individually rational and budget-balanced.
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Figure 1: Allocation of 1
2
¡double auction
Figure 2: Welfare improving allocation
Unfortunately it is not known which mechanism performs best in the class of all IR and
(ex-ante) budget balanced mechanisms. The general program of constructing the best
performing mechanism is given in the appendix. This optimization program suggests that
a mechanism might be able to extract more gains from trade if only for type combinations
(µ1; µ2) around
¡
1
2
; 1
2
¢
the partnership is not dissolved e¢ciently. Therefore I consider
allocation rules as given in Figure 2. Most gains from trade can be realized if we chose
the parameters ±1 2 [0; ±2] and ±2 2 [0; 12 ] such that12 ±1 = ±2: A comparison of the
performance of this ”third best” mechanism (denoted by GTB) with the 1
2
¡double auction
is given in Table 1 for some parameters a; b. Such mechanisms perform better than the
double auction with veto but a mechanism with ”simple” rules independent of vi and F
12These values of ±1 and ±2 are chosen such that the inequality condition of the maximization problem
given in the appendix (8) is binding. This is the case for
±1 = ±2 =
1
2 (16a¡ 8b)
³
¡2a+ 4b+ 2
p
(¡15a2 + 36ab¡ 12b2)
´
:
11
a b GDA GTB
1 .9 0.00169 0.00775
1 .7 0.02765 0.04459
1 .6 0.05248 0.06477
1 .55 0.06725 0.07437
1 .51 0.08002 0.08162
Table 1: Performance of 1
2
-double auction
performing better than the 1
2
¡double auction could not be obtained. Further calculations
show that the mechanisms implementing the allocation given in Figure 2 perform better,
especially if 2b is signi…cantly greater a. Nevertheless if parameters are such that we
almost have 2b = a the di¤erences in performance compared to the 1
2
¡double auction
become small.
5 Conclusion
The k¡double auction is a favorable mechanism to dissolve a partnership since it has
simple rules that do not depend on speci…cations of the agents’ valuations. If the in-
terdependent components of the valuation functions are small it can be applied without
worrying about agents’ participation decisions. Since this is not true any more if the
in‡uence of the other agent’s information becomes larger, it might not be possible to
successfully run a k¡double auction. This paper suggests a modi…cation of the 1
2
¡double
auction that is individually rational. Symmetric equilibria of this auction are derived and
it is shown that even though the mechanism is not always optimal, it succeeds in realizing
gains from trade. The rules remain simple and the mechanism designer does not need
to know the distribution of types to determine those types not willing to dissolve the
partnership. This is done by the participating agents themselves. An exemplarily com-
parison with another dissolution mechanism shows that (in contrast to the i.p.v. model)
the mechanism designer can construct more e¢cient mechanisms if she is familiar with
speci…cations of the valuations.
Unfortunately it was not possible to derive the incentive e¢cient mechanism in the
model of this paper. This is subject to further research.
6 Appendix
For simplicity of presentation I need the following notations and de…nitions in this ap-
pendix. In a direct revelation mechanisms (DRM) agents report their types, relin-
quish their share of the good, and then receive a payment ti (µ) and a share si (µ) of
the entire good. A DRM is therefore a game form ¡ =
¡£
µ1; µ1
¤
;
£
µ2; µ2
¤
; s; t
¢
, where
s (µ) = (s1 (µ) ; s2 (µ)) is a vector with components si : £2j=1
£
µj ; µj
¤ 7! [0; 1] such that
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s1 (µ)+ s2 (µ) = 1 for all µ; and t (µ) = (t1 (µ) ; t2 (µ)) is a vector with components
ti : £2j=1
£
µj; µj
¤ 7! R. I call s the allocation rule and t the payments. I refer to the
pair (s; t) as a DRM if it is clear which strategy sets
£
µi; µi
¤
are meant.
A mechanism (s; t) implements the allocation rule s if truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the game induced by ¡ and the agents’ utility functions. Such a mechanism
is called incentive compatible (IC).
The interim utility of agent i given his type µi and his announcement bµi (and truthtelling
of the other agent) is given by:
Ui
³
µi;bµi´ = Eµ¡i [v (µi; µ¡i)µsi ³bµi; µ¡i´¡ 12
¶
+ ti
³bµi; µ¡i´]
= : Eµ¡i [v (µi; µ¡i)
µ
si
³bµi; µ¡i´¡ 1
2
¶
] + Ti (µi) :
I use the following notation:
Ui (µi) := Ui (µi; µi) :
A DRM is called (ex-ante) budget balanced (BB) if T1 + T2 = 0: A DRM is individually
rational (IR) if
Ui (µi) ¸ 0 for all µi; i = 1; 2:
Performance is measured by realized gains from trade, i.e. by the unweighted sum of the
agents’ ex-ante utilities. An IC, IR, BB mechanism is called incentive e¢cient if there
exists no IC, IR and BB mechanism that performs better.
For some proofs I need a generalization of the revenue equivalence theorem to envi-
ronments with interdependent valuations of the form vi (µ1; µ2) = g (µi) + h (µ¡i) :
Theorem 6 (Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem) A DRM (s; t) is incentive compatible if and
only if the following holds for i = 1; 2:
a) si (µi) :=
R µ
µ
¡
si (µi; µ¡i)¡ 12
¢
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i is increasing in µi;
b) For all eµi; µi 2 £µ; µ¤ we have: Ui (µi) = Ui ³eµi´+ R µieµi g0 (t) si (t) dt
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the independent private values case.
6.1 The general problem an incentive e¢cient mechanism has
to solve
Given the model of section 4.1 the general problem an incentive e¢cient mechanism has
to solve is given by:
max
k1
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(U1 (µ1) + U2 (µ2)) dµ1dµ2
s.t. BB; IR; IC:
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To get IC we must have for some type eµi (according to Theorem 6):
Ui (µi) = Ui
³eµi´+ a Z µieµi
Z 1
0
µ
ki (t; µ¡i)¡ 1
2
¶
dµ¡idt; i = 1; 2:
Therefore we have (using integration by parts and BB):
U1
³eµ1´+ U2 ³eµ2´
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(U1 (µ1) + U2 (µ2)) dµ1dµ2 ¡ a
Z 1
0
Z µ1
eµ1
Z 1
0
µ
k1 (t; µ2)¡ 1
2
¶
dµ2dtdµ1
¡a
Z 1
0
Z µ2
eµ2
Z 1
0
µ
1
2
¡ k1 (µ1; t)
¶
dµ1dtdµ2
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
h
(2a¡ b) (µ1 ¡ µ2) + a
³
1
³
µ2 > eµ2´¡ 1³µ1 > eµ1´´iµk1 (µ1; µ2)¡ 1
2
¶
dµ2dµ1
The ”worst o¤” types, i.e. the types for which the individual rationality constraints are
binding, are given by
eµi = argmin
µi
Ui (µi) = argmin
µi
a
Z µi
0
Z 1
0
µ
ki (t; µ¡i)¡ 1
2
¶
dµ¡idt
and we therefore get
a
Z 1
0
µ
ki
³eµi; µ¡i´¡ 1
2
¶
dµ¡i = 0)
Z 1
0
ki
³eµi; µ¡i´ dµ¡i = 1
2
:
This is also su¢cient for being the ”worst o¤” type, because IC implies that
R 1
0
ki (t; µ¡i) dµ¡i
is increasing in t:
For IR to hold we need
U1
³eµ1´+ U2 ³eµ2´ ¸ 0:
The general problem of …nding an incentive e¢cient mechanism can therefore be formu-
lated as13:
max
k1
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(a¡ b) (µ1 ¡ µ2)
µ
k1 (µ1; µ2)¡ 1
2
¶
dµ1dµ2 (8)
13This formulation can be easily extended to the general case of separable valuation functions and
general (strictly increasing and continuous) distribution functions.
14
s.t.
max
k1
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(a¡ b) (µ1 ¡ µ2)
µ
k1 (µ1; µ2)¡ 1
2
¶
dµ1dµ2Z 1
0
Z 1
0
h
(2a¡ b) (µ1 ¡ µ2) + a
³
1
³
µ2 > eµ2´¡ 1³µ1 > eµ1´´iµk1 (µ1; µ2)¡ 1
2
¶
dµ2dµ1 ¸ 0;
k1 (µ1; µ2) 2 [0; 1];Z 1
0
k1
³eµ1; µ2´ dµ2 = Z 1
0
k1
³
µ1;eµ2´ dµ1 = 1
2
;Z 1
0
k1 (t; µ2) dµ2;
Z 1
0
k1 (µ1; t) dµ1 are increasing in t:
Given a solution k¤1 of this problem we get k
¤
2 = 1¡ k¤1 and can calculate the according
payments t1; t2 using Theorem 6. Note that the program above is much more complex
than in the bilateral trade case, where one agent owns the entire good. In that setting
the worst o¤ types do not depend on the allocation and the last condition turns out to
be not binding (given certain assumptions on F ).
6.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1:
In this proof I will denote an equilibrium of the k¡double-auction by (b1 (µ1) ; b2 (µ2))
where bi (µi) denotes the equilibrium bidding strategy of agent i: The agent other than i
is denoted by ¡i: Throughout the proof I will assume k 2 (0; 1) : The cases k = 1 and
k = 2 are indeed simpler to prove and can be found for a similar model in [1999].
I summarize the di¤erent steps to illustrate the logic behind the whole proof: In the
…rst step I show that the equilibrium has to ful…ll a (symmetric) system of di¤erential
equations if it is continuous and strictly increasing. In the 2nd step I show that an
equilibrium bidding strategy bi (µi) can only be decreasing if there is a gap in b¡i (µ¡i)
at µ¡i = F¡1 (k) : In step 3 I show that there cannot be atoms (i.e. a positive measure
of types submitting the same bid) in the equilibrium bidding functions of both agents at
the same bid. In the 4th step I show that the bids of the highest types have to be the
same for both bidders and that this is also the case for the bids of the lowest types, i.e.
b1 (µ) = b2 (µ) and b1
¡
µ
¢
= b2
¡
µ
¢
. We also get that bi (µ) > vi (µ; µ) and bi
¡
µ
¢
< vi
¡
µ; µ
¢
:
I derive conditions that must hold to allow equilibrium bidding functions to have atoms
(step 5) or gaps (step 6). Step 7 and 8 show that the di¤erential equations determine a
unique solution if starting from an initial condition bi (µ) =b (or bi
¡
µ
¢
= b) we increase
(decrease) µi as long as either µi = F¡1 (k) or bi (µi) = vi (µi; µi). In the 9th step I
show that for µi = F¡1 (k) we get that bi (µi) = vi (µi; µi) and furthermore that even at
µi = F
¡1 (k) the equilibrium bidding strategies are continuous. Hence the equilibrium
bidding strategies are strictly increasing (have no atoms) and are continuous (have no
gaps). This shows that the equilibrium has to ful…ll the symmetric system of di¤erential
equations derived in step 1 and therefore is symmetric. In the last step (10) I show that
it is unique, i.e. only one possible initial condition bi (µ) =b and bi
¡
µ
¢
= b can be ful…lled.
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The steps in detail:
1. Assume that for a given range
¡
bL; bH
¢
b1; b2 are continuous and strictly increasing
on b¡11
¡¡
bL; bH
¢¢
and b¡12
¡¡
bL; bH
¢¢
respectively and all types of player i that are
lower than all types in b¡1i
¡¡
bL; bH
¢¢
bid below bL and all types of player i that are
higher than all types in b¡1i
¡¡
bL; bH
¢¢
bid above bH :
The utility of a type µi-bidder submitting a bid b 2
¡
bL; bH
¢
is given by
Ui (µi; b) =
1
2
Z b¡1¡i (b)
µ
(vi (µ1; µ2)¡ ((1¡ k) b+ kb¡i (µ¡i))) f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
+
1
2
Z µ
b¡1¡i (b)
(kb+ (1¡ k) b¡i (µ¡i)¡ vi (µ1; µ2)) f (µ¡i) dµ¡i:
Because b1; b2 are continuous and strictly increasing and therefore a.e. di¤erentiable
on b¡11
¡¡
bL; bH
¢¢
and b¡12
¡¡
bL; bH
¢¢
respectively, the same is true for the inverse
functions b¡1i (b) on
¡
bL; bH
¢
: Di¤erentiating with respect to b yields the following
local …rst order conditions:¡
v1
¡
b¡11 (b) ; b
¡1
2 (b)
¢¡ b¢ f ¡b¡12 (b)¢ @b¡12 (b)@b ¡ 12 ¡F ¡b¡12 (b)¢¡ k¢ = 0; (9)¡
v2
¡
b¡11 (b) ; b
¡1
2 (b)
¢¡ b¢ f ¡b¡11 (b)¢ @b¡11 (b)@b ¡ 12 ¡F ¡b¡11 (b)¢¡ k¢ = 0:
Note that this system of di¤erential equations is given for the inverse functions of the
equilibrium bidding functions. Since it is Lipschitz-continuous if v1
¡
b¡11 (b) ; b
¡1
2 (b)
¢ 6=
b and v2
¡
b¡11 (b) ; b
¡1
2 (b)
¢ 6= b it uniquely determines b¡1i uniquely given an ”initial
condition” on intervals where b¡1i are strictly increasing, continuous and
v1
¡
b¡11 (b) ; b
¡1
2 (b)
¢ 6= b, v2 ¡b¡11 (b) ; b¡12 (b)¢ 6= b. In particular the bi are also
uniquely determined on the range of such an interval. If we have b¡11 = b
¡1
2 we
have Lipschitz-continuity if v1
¡
b¡11 (b) ; b
¡1
1 (b)
¢ 6= b or equivalently b1 (µ) 6= v1 (µ; µ) :
2. If bi is (locally) decreasing, i.e. if we have bi (µ
¤
i ) > bi (µ
¤¤
i ) for some µ
¤
i < µ
¤¤
i the
following holds:
Pr
µ¡i
fb¡i (µ¡i) 2 [bi (µ¤¤i ) ; bi (µ¤i )]g = 0
and
Pr
µ¡i
fb¡i (µ¡i) < bi (µ¤¤i )g = k:
The proof of this statement follows standard revealed preferences arguments.
16
3. It is impossible that a positive measure of types of agent 1 and 2 submit the same
bid, i.e. for all b we have:
Pr
µi
fbi (µi) = bg > 0) Pr
µ¡i
fb¡i (µ¡i) = bg = 0:
If the contrary statement were true, a bidder would prefer to increase or decrease
her bid slightly since this would hardly change payments but signi…cantly change
her probability of winning or loosing.
4. We have
b1 (µ) = b2 (µ) 6= b1
¡
µ
¢
= b2
¡
µ
¢
;
bi (µ) 2 [b1 (µ) ; b1
¡
µ
¢
]
and
b1 (µ) > v1 (µ; µ) ; b1
¡
µ
¢
< v1
¡
µ; µ
¢
:
Assume without loss in generality that infµ b1 (µ) > infµ b2 (µ) (I allow the last value
to be ¡1): Then it is pro…table for a type of player 2 who bids below infµ b1 (µ) to
increase her bid such that she still looses against all types of player 1. Therefore we
must have
inf
µ
b1 (µ) = inf
µ
b2 (µ) : (10)
The monotonicity condition 2. implies that we must have
b1 (µ) = b2 (µ) = inf
µ
b1 (µ) = inf
µ
b2 (µ) :
An analogues argument sows that
b1
¡
µ
¢
= b2
¡
µ
¢
= sup
µ
b1 (µ) = sup
µ
b2 (µ) :
We also obtain b1 (µ) 6= b1
¡
µ
¢
from 2.
In addition we know that b1 (µ) > v1 (µ; µ). This is because we cannot have an atom
at b1 (µ) in both agents’ strategies and therefore if we had b1 (µ) · v1 (µ; µ) at least
for one agent raising her bid by a small " gains 1
2
k" when she sells (with probability
close to one) and loses less then 1
2
(1¡ k) " when she buys (with arbitrarily small
probability). A similar reasoning shows that b1
¡
µ
¢
< v1
¡
µ; µ
¢
:
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5. It is only possible to have an atom at eb (i.e. a positive measure of types biddingeb) in the bidding function of agent i if there is either a gap in the equilibrium
bidding function of the other agent below or above eb or if for µ¡i := b¡1¡i ³eb´ we
have Eµi [v¡i (µ1; µ2) j bi (µi) = eb] = eb: This is because a small change in the bid
for types bidding close to eb does hardly change payments but signi…cantly changes
the probability of winning and losing. Therefore it is pro…table to increase the
bid slightly above eb instead of bidding just below eb if the expected value for the
partnership is higher than its price, i.e. if Eµi [v¡i (µ1; µ2) j bi (µi) = eb] > eb; or to
lower the bid from just above eb to just below eb if Eµi[v¡i (µ1; µ2) j bi (µi) = eb] < eb:
6. I show that if there is a gap between b¤ and b¤¤ in the equilibrium bidding function
of agent i and we have
(1¡ k) Pr
µi
fbi (µi) · b¤g < k Pr
µi
fbi (µi) ¸ b¤¤g:
then we must have
(1¡ k) Pr
µ¡i
fb¡i (µ¡i) · b¤g ¸ k Pr
µ¡i
fb¡i (µ¡i) ¸ b¤¤g:
I assume without loss in generality that Prµifbi (µi) 2 (b¤; b¤¤)g = 0 and Prµifbi (µi) 2
(b¤ ¡ "; b¤]g > 0, Prµifbi (µi) 2 [b¤¤; b¤¤ + ")g > 0 for all " > 0: Note that
(1¡ k) Prµifbi (µi) · b¤g < k Prµifbi (µi) ¸ b¤¤g implies that there is also a gap
in the bidding function of agent ¡i between b¤ and b¤¤ since a su¢ciently small
increase of a bid within the interval (b¤; b¤¤) of agent ¡i leads to higher expected
payments without changing the winning (and loosing) probability. Because of 3.
we cannot have atoms at b¤ in the equilibrium bidding strategies of both players.
Therefore if we had (1¡ k) Prµ¡ifb¡i (µ¡i) · b¤g < k Prµ¡ifb¡i (µ¡i) ¸ b¤¤g at least
one player could gain by increasing her bid from b¤ to just below b¤¤ since this leads
to higher expected payments without changing the winning (and loosing) probabil-
ity.
Similar arguments show that if we have
(1¡ k) Pr
µi
fbi (µi) · b¤g > k Pr
µi
fbi (µi) ¸ b¤¤g
then we must have
(1¡ k) Pr
µ¡i
fb¡i (µ¡i) · b¤g · k Pr
µ¡i
fb¡i (µ¡i) ¸ b¤¤g:
7. This part shows that starting from an initial bid b1 (µ) =b > vi (µ; µ) ; it is possible
to uniquely continue the solution of the di¤erential equation (9) by increasing µ til
either µ = F¡1 (k) or b1 (µ) = vi (µ; µ) :
De…ne µ¤ = arg supfµ < F¡1 (k) j b1 (x) = b2 (x) > vi (x; x) for all x · µ¤g (note
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that because of 4. µ¤ is well de…ned). I show that either µ¤ = F¡1 (k) or b1 (µ¤) =
vi (µ
¤; µ¤) : If this were not the case we could …nd µ" arbitrarily close to µ¤ with
µ" 2 (µ¤; F¡1 (k)) and vi (µ; µ) < bi (µ) < b¡i (µ) for all14 µ 2 (µ¤; µ"]. Note that
we cannot have a gap after15 b · bi (µ") :In addition we cannot have atoms in
the equilibrium bidding functions at b 2 [bi (µ¤) ; bi (µ")] if µ" is su¢ciently close
to µ¤. Assume there existed an interval [µDj ; µ
U
j ]; µ
D
j 2 [µ¤; µ"] of agent j biddingeb 2 [bi (µ¤) ; bi (µ")]: Since there are no gaps in the bidding function of ¡j after or
before eb we have (because of 5.) for eµ¡j = b¡1¡j ³eb´ · µ" that
Eµj [v¡j
³
µj;eµ¡j´ 1³bj (µj) = eb´] = eb:
Since we have v¡j (µ"; µ") < bi (µ") < b¡i (µ") this implies v¡j
³
µUj ;
eµ¡j´ > eb: There-
fore if µ" is chosen arbitrarily close to µ
¤ (which is possible) we have µUj > eµ¡j which
implies vj
³
µUj ;
eµ¡j´ > v¡j ³µUj ;eµ¡j´ > eb: On the other hand we have eµ¡j < F¡1 (k)
hence type µU of agent j wins with a probability smaller k and looses with a prob-
ability greater k and can therefore improve by raising her bid from eb < vj ³µUj ;eµ¡j´
(and winning against types close to eµ¡j where winning is pro…table because of eb <
vj
³
µUj ;
eµ¡j´). Since there are neither gaps nor atoms equilibrium in [bi (µ¤) ; bi (µ")]
(9) prescribes a symmetric solution16 for µ 2 (µ¤; µ") which is a contradiction to the
de…nition of µ¤ and this part of the proof is complete.
Since b1; b2 can have neither gaps nor atoms in this range (because of 3. and 6.) and
are strictly increasing (because of 2.) the same holds for b¡11 ; b
¡1
2 :We can therefore,
starting from an initial bid b1 (µ) =b > vi (µ; µ) ; uniquely continue the solution of the
di¤erential equation (9) by increasing µ til either µ = F¡1 (k) or b1 (µ) = vi (µ; µ) :
The same reasoning shows that starting with b1
¡
µ
¢
= b2
¡
µ
¢
< v
¡
µ; µ
¢
if we decrease
the type µi; b1 and b2 are uniquely determined by (9) (and therefore symmetric) as
long as µi > F¡1 (k)and bi (µi) < vi (µi; µi) :
8. If we can exclude for equilibrium bidding strategies b1 (µ1) ; b2 (µ2) that bi (µi) =
vi (µi; µi) is possible if µi 6= F¡1 (k) we have shown that any equilibrium is given
by b1 (µ) and b1
¡
µ
¢
and the di¤erentiable solution of (9) for µ1 6= F¡1 (k). As-
sume without loss in generality that bi (µi) > vi (µi; µi) for all µi < µ
¤
i and we have
bi (µ
¤
i ) = vi (µ
¤
i ; µ
¤
i ) and µ
¤
i < F
¡1 (k) : Arguments similar to those used in 7. show
that there are neither gaps nor atoms in a small environment around bi (µ
¤
i ) which
implies that (9) is valid: Even though its solution is not necessarily unique any
more (because bi (µ
¤
i ) = vi (µ
¤
i ; µ
¤
i )) we can deduce from (9) that at least for µi > µ
¤
i
14Note that because of 2. bidding strategies cannot decrease in a neighborhood of µ¤.
15If we had a gap one of the bidders could improve by increasing her bid from b into the gap.
16In fact (9) is a di¤erential equation b¡11 ; b
¡1
2 have to ful…ll locally, if b
¡1
1 ; b
¡1
2 are di¤erentiable (a.e.).
This is the case since b1 and b2 are strictly increasing and continuous (in the cinsidered range) and
therefore the same is true for b¡11 ; b
¡1
2 :
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and close to µ¤i the derivatives of bi (µi) are decreasing which is in contrast to 2.
and therefore not possible. Again a similar argument shows that we cannot have
bi (µ
¤
i ) = vi (µ
¤
i ; µ
¤
i ) and µ
¤
i > F
¡1 (k) :
Because of continuity of bi and v we have bi (µi) > vi (µi; µi) for µi < F¡1 (k) and
bi (µi) < vi (µi; µi) for µi > F¡1 (k) which implies (because of 2.) that bi (µi) is con-
tinuous at µi = F¡1 (k) and we have bi (F¡1 (k)) = vi (F¡1 (k) ; F¡1 (k)) :
9. From the previous steps we know that any equilibrium (b1; b2) has to be symmetric,
strictly increasing and must be a solution of the symmetric system of di¤erential
equations given by (9). Furthermore an equilibrium is uniquely determined by (9)
and the initial conditions µ= b¡1i (b) and µ = b
¡1
i
¡
b
¢
where b and b denote the lowest
and highest bid since vi (µ; µ) = b (µ) , µ = F¡1 (k). Therefore any equilibrium
must also be a solution of the following di¤erential equation, which is directly derived
from (9) by using the symmetry property of the equilibrium:
(vi (µ; µ)¡ b (µ))¡ 1
2
F (µ)¡ k
f (µ)
db (µ)
dµ
= 0:
This is a linear di¤erential equation and it is easy to verify that its solutions for
µ 6= F¡1 (k) must have the following form:
b (µ) = vi (µ; µ)¡
R µ
c
dvi(µ;µ)
dµ
(F (t)¡ k)2 dt
(F (µ)¡ k)2 ; c 2 R:
Since for any equilibrium we have b (F¡1 (k)) = v (F¡1 (k) ; F¡1 (k)) we must have
c = F¡1 (k) and therefore the only possible candidate for an equilibrium is given
by 4. Checking the second order condition (which can be done by straight forward
calculations) reveals that (b1 (µ) ; b2 (µ)) with b1 (µ) = b2 (µ) = b (µ) according to (4)
indeed constitutes an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Because of Theorem 6 we know that the agents’ interim utilities by participation in
a mechanism that implements the e¢cient allocation of the partnership must have the
following representations, where
Q (µi) =
Z µi
eµi g
0 (t) si (t) dt and R (µi) = Eµ¡i [vi (µi; µ¡i)
µ
si
³bµi; µ¡i´¡ 1
2
¶
]
do not depend on payments17:
1. Ui (µi) = Ui
³eµi´+Q (µi) where eµi denotes the type for which participation is most
costly/ least pro…table18
17Because of symmetry Q and R are independent of i.
18Note that eµi is the same for all e¢cient mechanisms. It can easily be shown that eµi = F¡1 ¡12¢ :
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2. Ui (µi) = R (µi)+Ti (µi) where Ti (µi) are the expected payments to a type µi agent.
If there exists an incentive compatible, e¢cient, budget balanced and individually
rational mechanism this mechanism satis…es
UMi
³eµi´ = Eµi [R (µi)¡Q (µi) + TMi (µi)] ¸ 0
and because of budget balancedness we have Eµ[TM1 (µ1) + T
M
2 (µ2)] · 0 and therefore
UM1
³eµ1´+ UM2 ³eµ2´ · 2Eµi [R (µi)¡Q (µi)]:
Since the k¡double auction is budget balanced and e¢cient (as a result of Theorem 1)
the interim utilities of the ”worst-o¤” types UDA1
³eµ1´ = UDA2 ³eµ2´in the double auction
must satisfy:
UDA1
³eµ1´+ UDA2 ³eµ2´ = Eµ[2R (µ1)¡ 2Q (µ1) + TM1 (µ1) + TM2 (µ2)]
= 2Eµi[R (µ1)¡Q (µ1)]
¸ UM1
³eµ1´+ UM2 ³eµ2´ ¸ 0:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Instead of directly verifying that a deviation of the given strategy cannot be pro…table
if the other agent sticks to it, I use the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem (Theorem 6) for an
indirect proof. Given an allocation rule s; the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem determines
(up to a type-independent constant) the payments (depending on the agents’ reported
types) necessary and su¢cient to implement s in a truthtelling equilibrium. By the rev-
elation principle in any (indirect) mechanism that implements s the expected payments
to agents in equilibrium have to equal those given by the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem
(up to a type independent constant). Furthermore if the expected payments to agents
induced by a candidate of an equilibrium (i.e. (7)) of an indirect mechanism that imple-
ments s equal those given by the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem we know that imitating
the strategy of a di¤erent type cannot be pro…table. Therefore I have to show that the
payments induced by the given strategies of the double-auction with veto equal those
of a direct mechanism that implements the same allocation as the suggested equilibrium
strategies. If in addition I can show that deviating to a bid outside the range of (7) cannot
be pro…table these have to constitute an equilibrium.
I split the proof in four steps:
1. I show that the condition
F (c) + F (d) = 1
is necessary for the induced allocation to result from equilibrium bidding behavior.
21
2. For general c; d 2 [µ,µ] with F (c) + F (d) = 1 I calculate the expected payments of
a direct mechanism that implements the allocation that would result from bidding
according to (7).
3. For general c; d 2 [µ,µ] with F (c) + F (d) = 1 I calculate the expected payments
induced by (7) and show that these equal the payments derived in step 3. if (and
only if) (6) holds.
4. I show that no type has an incentive to bid outside the range of b (µi) de…ned by
(7).
Step 1:
If the agents would bid according to (7) this would result in the following allocation:
si;c;d (µ) :=
8<: 1 if µi > µ¡i and µi; µ¡i =2 [c; d]12 if µi 2 [c; d]; µ¡i 2 [c; d]
0 if µi · µ¡i and µi; µ¡i =2 [c; d];
i = 1; 2:
Because of the Revenue-Equivalence-Theorem this allocation can only be implemented if
si;c;d (µi) =
Z µ
µ
µ
si;c;d (µi; µ¡i)¡ 1
2
¶
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
is increasing in µi: This is the case i¤ F (c)+F (d) = 1. To see this note that for µi 2 [µ; c]
we have Z µ
µ
µ
si;c;d (µi; µ¡i)¡ 1
2
¶
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
= F (µi) +
1
2
(F (d)¡ F (c))¡ 1
2
:
Similarly for µi 2 [d; 1] we haveZ µ
µ
µ
si;c;d (µi; µ¡i)¡ 1
2
¶
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
= F (µi)¡ 1
2
(F (d)¡ F (c))¡ 1
2
:
Therefore ki;c;d (µi) is increasing i¤
F (µi) +
1
2
(F (d)¡ F (c))¡ 1
2
· 0 8µi · c, F (c) + F (d) · 1
F (µi)¡ 1
2
(F (d)¡ F (c))¡ 1
2
¸ 0 8µi ¸ d, F (c) + F (d) ¸ 1
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Which means that F (c) + F (d) = 1 .
Step 2: Because of step 1 and Theorem 6 (s; t) is IC i¤ we have for an arbitrary typeeµi:
Ui (µi) = Ui
³eµi´+ Z µieµi g0 (t) si;c;d (t) dt:
Note that this implies that all agents of type µi 2 [c; d] must get the same interim utility,
which we denote by K. Because of
Ti (µi) = U (µi)¡ Eµ¡i
·
(g (µi) + h (µ¡i))
µ
si;c;d (µi; µ¡i)¡ 1
2
¶¸
it follows immediately that Ti (µi) = K if µi 2 [c; d]. If µi 2 [µ; c] [[d; µ] straight forward
calculations result in
Ti (µi) = K ¡ (g (µi) + h (µi))F (µi) +
Z µ1
c
g0 (t)F (t) dt+
1
2
Z µi
c
h0 (t)F (t) dt
+
1
2
Z µ1
µ
h0 (t)F (t) dt¡ 1
2
Z µ
d
h0 (t)F (t) dt (11)
+
1
2
h
¡
µ
¢¡ 1
2
h (d)F (d) + g (c)F (c) +
1
2
h (c)F (c) ;
if µi 2 [c; d] and if µi 2 [d; µ] then we get
Ti (µi) = K ¡ (g (µi) + h (µi))F (µi) +
Z µ1
d
g0 (t)F (t) dt+
1
2
Z c
µ
h0 (t)F (t) dt
+
1
2
Z µ1
d
h0 (t)F (t) dt¡ 1
2
Z µ
µ1
h0 (t)F (t) dt (12)
+
1
2
h
¡
µ
¢
+
1
2
h (d)F (d) + g (d)F (d)¡ 1
2
h (c)F (c) :
Step 3: We have to check whether the expected payments induced by bidding ac-
cording to bi (µi) de…ned by (7) equal those derived in the previous step. If this is the case
we know that no agent can pro…t by deviating to another bid in the range of the given
bidding function or by vetoing in case he has not vetoed before.
First note that b (µi) is strictly increasing in µi 2 [µ; c) [ (d; µ]: Using l’Hôpital’s rule
we get
lim
µi!c
bi (µi) = g (c) + h (c)
and
lim
µi!d
bi (µi) = g (d) + h (d) :
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In a next step I show that the expected payments to the agents equal those derived in step
2. For µi 2 [c; d] this is obviously the case i¤ K = 0. Consider …rst the case µi 2 [µ; c):
Given the rules of the auction we have:
Ti (µi) = ¡
Z µi
µ
b (µi) + b (µ¡i)
4
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i +
Z c
µi
b (µi) + b (µ¡i)
4
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
+
Z µ
d
b (µi) + b (µ¡i)
4
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
= ¡1
2
(g (µi) + h (µi))F (µi) +
1
2
(g (µi) + h (µi))F (c)
+
1
2
R µi
c
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c))2 dt
F (µi)¡ F (c)
¡1
4
Z µi
µ
(g (t) + h (t)) f (t) dt+
1
4
Z c
µi
(g (t) + h (t)) f (t) dt
+
1
4
Z µ
d
(g (t) + h (t)) f (t) dt
+
1
4
Z µi
µ
R µ¡i
c
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c))2 dt
(F (µ¡i)¡ F (c))2
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
¡1
4
Z c
µi
R µ¡i
c
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c))2 dt
(F (µ¡i)¡ F (c))2
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
¡1
4
Z µ
d
R µ¡i
d
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c))2 dt
(F (µ¡i)¡ F (d))2
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i
!
Integration by parts and using the fact that
lim
µi!c
R µi
c
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c))2 dt
F (µi)¡ F (c) = limµi!c
(g0 (µi) + h0 (µi)) (F (µi)¡ F (c))2 dt
f (µi)
= 0
gives:
Ti (µi) = ¡ (g (µi) + h (µi))F (µi) +
Z µi
c
g0 (t)F (t) dt+
1
2
Z µi
c
h0 (t)F (t) dt
+
1
2
Z µi
µ
h0 (t)F (t) dt+
1
2
Z c
µ
g0 (t)F (t) dt
+
1
4
(g (µ) + h (µ))F (c) +
1
2
(g (c) + h (c))F (c)
¡1
4
R µ
c
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c))2 dt
F (c)
+
1
4
Z µ
d
(g (t) + h (t)) f (t) dt
+
1
4
R µ
d
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (d))2 dt
F (c)
¡ 1
4
Z µ
d
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (d)) dt
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This equals the expected payments given in (11) i¤
1
2
Z c
µ
g0 (t)F (t) dt+
1
4
(g (µ) + h (µ))F (c) +
1
2
(g (c) + h (c))F (c)
¡1
4
R µ
c
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c))2 dt
F (c)
+
1
4
Z µ
d
(g (t) + h (t)) f (t) dt
+
1
4
R µ
d
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (d))2 dt
F (c)
¡ 1
4
Z µ
d
(g0 (t)¡ h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (d)) dt
=
1
2
Z µ
d
h (t) f (t) dt+ g (c)F (c) +
1
2
h (c)F (c)
, 1
4
R µ
c
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c))2 dt
F (c)
¡ 1
4
R µ
d
(g0 (t) + h0 (t)) (F (t)¡ F (d))2 dt
F (c)
¡1
2
Z c
µ
g0 (t)F (t) dt+
1
2
Z µ
d
g0 (t)F (t) dt
¡1
4
¡
(g (µ) + h (µ))F (c) +
¡
g
¡
µ
¢
+ h
¡
µ
¢¢
F (d)
¢
¡1
4
¡
g
¡
µ
¢¡ h ¡µ¢¢+ 1
2
g (d)F (d) +
1
2
g (c)F (c)
= 0: (13)
Similar calculations reveal that the expected payments a player of type µi 2 (d; µ] can
expect by participating in the auction equals the expected payments given by (12) under
the same condition. Therefore the expected payments in the double auction with veto
equal those derived in the previous step i¤ (13) holds which is equivalent to (6).
Step 5: It remains to show that no type has an incentive to change his bid to a number
out of the set: (¡1; b (µ)) [ [b (c) ; b (d)] [ (b ¡µ¢ ;1) (I de…ne b (c) := limµ!c b (c) =
g (c)+h (c)and b (d) := limµ!d b (d) = g (d)+h (d)). A bidder would always prefer b (µ) to
any bid in (¡1; b (µ)) because in either case he never gets the partnership but he receives
more money if he bids b (µ) instead of bidding a number in (¡1; b (µ)): For a similar
reason he would never bid a number in (b
¡
µ
¢
;1). To see why it is never pro…table to
bid eb 2 [b (c) ; b (d)] note …rst that the utility of a bidder having type µi and biddingeb 2 [b (c) ; b (d)] gives him utility
Ui
³
µi;eb´ = 1
2
Z c
µ
µ
h (µ¡i)¡ b (µ¡i)
2
¶
f (µ¡i) dµ¡i ¡ 1
2
Z µ
d
µ
h (µ¡i)¡ b (µ¡i)
2
¶
which does not depend on eb as long as eb 2 [b (c) ; b (d)]: On the other hand we know from
the calculations above, that the bidder has no incentive to deviate to bidding b (c) or b (d)
(because the above calculations do not use the fact that types c and d veto instead of
bidding b (c) and b (d)): Therefore he has no incentive to bid eb 2 [b (c) ; b (d)].
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5:
It has to be shown that there always exists a solution c; d 2 (µ; µ) to the equations:
1 = F (c) + F (d)
0 =
1
2F (c)
Z c
µ
(g (t) + h (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c)) f (t) dt
+
1
2F (c)
Z µ
d
(g (t) + h (t)) (F (t)¡ F (d)) f (t) dt
+
1
2
Z c
µ
g (t) f (t) dt¡ 1
2
Z µ
d
g (t) f (t) dt
Because of the strict monotonicity of F we can combine these equations to:
Q (c) : =
1
2F (c)
Z c
µ
(g (t) + h (t)) (F (t)¡ F (c)) f (t) dt
+
1
2F (c)
Z µ
F¡1(1¡F (c))
(g (t) + h (t)) (F (t)¡ 1 + F (c)) f (t) dt
+
1
2
Z c
µ
g (t) f (t) dt¡ 1
2
Z µ
F¡1(1¡F (c))
g (t) f (t) dt
= 0
As a next step I calculate the value of Q
¡
F¡1
¡
1
2
¢¢
.
Q
µ
F¡1
µ
1
2
¶¶
=
Z µ
µ
(g (t) + h (t))
µ
F (t)¡ 1
2
¶
f (t) dt+
1
2
Z F¡1( 12)
µ
g (t) f (t) dt
¡1
2
Z µ
F¡1( 12)
g (t) f (t) dt
=
Z µ
µ
g (t)F (t) f (t) dt¡
Z µ
F¡1( 12)
g (t) f (t) dt¡ 1
2
Z µ
µ
h (t) f (t) dt
+
Z µ
µ
h (t)F (t) f (t) dt
=
Z µ
µ
g (t)F (t) f (t) dt¡
Z µ
F¡1( 12)
g (t) f (t) dt+
1
2
Z µ
µ
h0 (t)F (t) dt
¡1
2
Z µ
µ
h0 (t)F 2 (t) dt
Because I assumed the existence condition in Theorem 3 not to hold we have
Q
µ
F¡1
µ
1
2
¶¶
> 0:
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On the other hand we have Q (µ) = 0. Because of the continuity of Q (c) we have proved
the statement if we can show that for an arbitrary " > 0 we have Q0 (c) < 0 for c 2 (µ; ").
Using
dF¡1 (1¡ F (c))
dc
= ¡ f (c)
f (F¡1 (1¡ F (c)))
we get
Q0 (c) = ¡
f (c)
R c
µ
(g (t) + h (t))F (t) f (t) dt
2F 2 (c)
¡
f (c)
R µ
F¡1(1¡F (c)) (g (t) + h (t)) (F (t)¡ 1) f (t) dt
2F 2 (c)
+
1
2
g (c) f (c)¡ 1
2
g
¡
F¡1 (1¡ F (c))¢ f (c)
and hence using l’Hôpital’s rule (for which we need that f 00 exists):
lim
c!µ
Q0 (c) = ¡1
4
(g (µ) + h (µ)) f (µ) +
1
4
¡
g
¡
µ
¢
+ h
¡
µ
¢¢
f (µ)
+
1
2
g (µ) f (µ)¡ 1
2
g
¡
µ
¢
f (µ)
=
1
4
f (µ)
£¡
g (µ)¡ g ¡µ¢¢¡ ¡h (µ)¡ h ¡µ¢¢¤
< 0
where the last inequality results because of the assumption that g0 > h0:
Q.E.D.
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